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Abstract
Chinese financial authorities began to liberalize their economy in the 1970s, though it would
take two more decades to realize a solution to the massive non-performing loan (NPL)
problem faced by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). In order to remove and dispose
of bad assets left over from the policy-lending era of the former command economy, the State
Council created four public asset management corporations (AMCs) between April and
October of 1999. The AMCs, under the administration of the Ministry of Finance, were
responsible for the acquisition, management, and disposal of NPLs from their assigned stateowned commercial bank. In addition to maximizing returns on the recovery of assets
offloaded by the SOCBs, the AMCs were mandated to assist in the restructuring of stateowned enterprises (SOEs) by facilitating debt-to-equity swap agreements. The government
provided funding for NPL purchases in the form of an initial equity capital injection of RMB
40 billion (provided by the Ministry of Finance [MoF] and split equally among the four
AMCs), credit from the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), and special AMC bonds held by the
big four state-owned commercial banks. In total, RMB 1.4 trillion (1 USD = RMB 8.3 in 1999)
in NPLs were acquired by the four AMCs over the course of 1999 and 2000. After having
transferred approximately RMB 136.3 billion (USD 16.9 billion) to the MoF and PBoC, the
AMCs ceased NPL operations by the end of December 2006. They have since been
restructured to operate as nonbank financial institutions.
Keywords: China, asset management corporations, asset purchase programs

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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China: 1999 Asset Management Corporations
At a Glance
While the Chinese government began to
liberalize its command economy in the
1970s, it was not until the mid-1990s that
it enacted an ambitious program of fiscal,
monetary, and regulatory reforms to
restructure its financial system. This
involved, among other interventions,
recapitalizing the state-owned commercial
banks, opening up the command economy
to foreign competition, and bolstering
financial regulation and supervision
(García-Herrero et al. 2006). The Ministry
of Finance (MoF) was particularly
concerned with the removal of nonperforming loans (NPLs) from the balance
sheets of state-owned commercial banks
whose portfolios were estimated to
account for up to 65% of total loans
outstanding by the late 1990s (Fung and
Ma 2002).
Like their counterparts in many Asian
countries at the time, Chinese government
officials decided to create “resolution
agencies” for the express purpose of
acquiring and disposing of bad assets
(Fung and Ma 2002). These four asset
management
corporations
(AMCs),
formally established by the State Council
between April and October of 1999, were
mandated to acquire and resolve NPLs left
over from the policy lending days of the
centrally planned economy (Bonin and
Huang; Fung et al. 2011; Fung and Ma
2002). The entities were structured as
individual state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
wholly owned and operated by the

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To purchase non-performing loans from
four state-owned commercial banks and dispose of
them over a period of 10 years (Fung and Ma 2002)
Launch Dates

Announcement: April 1999
First transfer: September 1999
by Cinda Asset Management
(Bonin and Huang 2000)

Wind-down Dates

December 2006

Size and Type of
NPL Problem

40% of total banking system
loans (Fung and Ma 2002)
Residual NPLs of state-owned
commercial banks left over
from the command economy

Program Size

Not specified at outset

Eligible Institutions

Big
four
state-owned
commercial banks
Open-bank only

Usage

RMB 1.4 trillion (USD 169
billion) by four institutions
between 1999 and 2000 (Fung
and Ma 2002)

Outcomes

RMB 136.3 billion (USD 16.9
billion) in funds generated by
disposal of assets as of March
2005 (García-Herrero et al.
2006)

Ownership
Structure

Government-owned

Notable Features

AMCs also mandated by the
government to manage debtfor-equity
conversion
agreements for state-owned
enterprises (Fung and Ma
2002);
At some unspecified point, the
AMC-partner bank model
evolved into an auction model
(García-Herrero et al. 2006)
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Ministry of Finance (MoF) but allowed to intervene in the market on behalf of the
government (Fung and Ma 2002). Secondarily, the AMCs were responsible for the
restructuring of some large-debtor SOEs through debt-to-equity conversion agreements
(Bonin and Huang 2000; Fung and Ma 2000).3
Each AMC was initially paired with one of the four largest state-owned commercial banks, a
divide-and-conquer strategy that had been employed by Swedish authorities to manage the
decentralized NPL problem (García-Herrero et al. 2006; Fung and Ma 2002). Funding was
provided in a variety of forms, including an RMB 40 billion4 equity capital injection provided
by the MoF and split equally among the four AMCs, credit from the People’s Bank of China
(PBoC), and non-tradeable AMC bonds issued to the big four partner banks in exchange for
transferred assets. Although the State Council legally allowed the AMCs to engage in
commercial borrowing to fund its purchases, there had been no documentation of such
activities as of 2001 (Fung and Ma 2002).
The AMCs were mandated to maximize NPL recovery over a period of ten years (Bonin and
Huang 2000). During the first restructuring wave, each AMC acquired NPLs from its partner
SOCB at face value for a total amount equivalent to 8% of GDP, issuing a 10-year bond with
an annual 2.25% coupon for 83% of that amount and paying the remaining 17% in cash. At
some unspecified point between the first and second waves of NPL transfers, the government
decided to switch from the partner-bank model to a more traditional auction model which
allowed AMCs to place bids for the remaining assets (García-Herrero et al. 2006). Cinda Asset
Management, which had far outperformed its counterparts in terms of maximizing asset
recovery, won the bid by promising a 30% recovery rate (Fung and Ma 2002; García-Herrero
et al. 2006). As of 2002, Cinda accounted for nearly 40% of all cash recovery by the four AMCs
(Fung and Ma 2002).
At some point over the course of AMC operations, Chinese authorities decided that the end
of 2006 would be the deadline for resolving NPLs still held by the AMCs. RMB 136.3 billion
(USD 16.9 billion) in cash funds were generated by the disposal of assets as of March 2005
(García-Herrero et al. 2006).
Summary Evaluation
While there has been little evaluation of the success of the AMCs in isolation, secondary
sources have argued that Chinese authorities took major steps toward resolving the national
NPL problem by establishing the AMC regime (Fung and Ma 2002; García-Herrero et al.
2006). Fung et al. (2011) write that the establishment of the AMCs was “a pre-emptive
measure to restructure and strengthen the Chinese banking system.” However, Fung and Ma

3
4

For further analysis and commentary on the debt-to-equity conversions, please refer to Fung and Ma 2002.
1 USD = RMB 8.3 in 1999 (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics).
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(2002) emphasized that the AMCs were “burdened with multiple tasks of quick asset
disposition and medium-term corporate restructuring,” the latter of which posed a
substantial conflict of interest to the official mandate of maximizing NPL recovery. Bonin and
Huang, writing in 2000, also foresaw problems regarding the state-owned structure of the
AMCs and noted the logistical issues with staffing such specialized institutions with transfers
from the four state-owned commercial banks and other government agencies. Additionally,
the authors suggest that a moral hazard problem might arise from the one-to-one
relationship between AMCs and partner banks, one that could “[foster] collusive behavior
and [inhibit] competition” (Bonin and Huang 2000).
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1999 Asset Management Corporations: China Context
GDP
$1.0 trillion in 1998
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$1.1 trillion in 1999
USD)
GDP per capita
$829 in 1998
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$873 in 1999
USD)
Data for 1998:
Moody’s: Data unavailable
S&P: BBB+
Fitch: Data unavailable
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)
Data for 1999:
Moody’s: Data unavailable
S&P: BBB
Fitch: Data unavailable
$1.0 trillion in 1998
Size of banking system
$1.2 trillion in 1999
Size of banking system as a percentage of
101.4% in 1998
GDP
110.2% in 1999
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available for 1998
financial system
Data not available for 1999
49.6% in 1998
5-bank concentration of banking system
47.1% in 1999
Data not available for 1998
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for 1999
Data not available for 1998
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for 1999
No in 1998
Existence of deposit insurance
No in 1999
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The transition from a command economy to a competitive
banking system necessitated, among other measures, the restructuring of stateowned commercial banks through NPL resolution and public capital injections.
As part of this nationwide campaign to liberalize the command economy, Chinese authorities
established four operationally similar asset management corporations (AMCs) to remove
non-performing loans (NPLs) from state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) (García-Herrero
2006; Fung and Ma 2002).
Officials launched the AMCs following a series of capital injections to the SOCBs, which began
in 1998 with an RMB injection equivalent to USD 33 billion. This was followed in December
2003 by a targeted injection of USD 22.5 billion in the two “best-performing” SOCBs, China
Construction Bank and the Bank of China (García-Herrero 2006). The third and final
restructuring wave began in April 2005 with the injection of USD 15 billion into the
Industrial Commercial Bank. All told, the Chinese government injected an estimated 20-24%
of 2004 GDP into the banking system (García-Herrero 2006, 313).
2. Legal Authority: An executive order issued by the State Council in 2000 provided
the principal legal basis for the establishment of the AMCs.
The executive order was issued a year after the actual setup of the four AMCs and did not
include any explicit operational terms or details (Fung et al. 2011).
3. Special Powers: It does not seem that the Chinese authorities delegated special
powers or authority to the AMCs.
Although the AMCs were mandated to conduct other operations aside from NPL
management and disposal, it does not appear from sources consulted that they were given
special powers for debt collection or recovery from debtors.
4. Mandate: The four AMCs were officially mandated to remove NPLs from stateowned commercial banks’ balance sheets, manage them prior to disposal, and
maximize asset recovery over a period of ten years, while also helping to restructure
large state-owned enterprises.
Cinda Asset Management Corporation, by far the most successful of the four AMCs in terms
of cash recovery, was mandated to collect what it could from the borrowers; otherwise, it
would repackage the loans for discounted sale on the secondary market (Fung and Ma 2002;
Bonin and Huang 2000).
In addition to NPL purchase and resolution, the AMCs were responsible for managing debtto-equity swap conversion agreements to support approximately 500 “large and heavilyindebted” state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Fung et al. 2011; Fung and Ma 2002). According
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to Fung et al. (2011), the government involved the AMCs in this restructuring effort in order
to achieve SOE profitability within three years.
Apart from its mandated responsibilities, the AMCs were allowed to involve themselves in
certain commercial activities. Such operations included the brokering of securities in order
to facilitate the sales of equity holdings through stock listings. The AMCs thus intervened in
the markets on behalf of the government, competing directly with the private sector and
potentially raising a conflict of interest between policy mandates and commercial incentives
(Fung and Ma 2002).
5.

Ownership Structure: The four AMCs were solely owned by the Ministry of
Finance.

The four AMCs were officially structured as SOEs, “state-owned non-bank financial
institutions set up by the State Council,” until the Ministry of Finance was able to “propose
solutions to final AMC loss” (Fung and Ma 2002).
6.

Governance Structure: Though legally independent, the four AMCs were
overseen by three government agencies, all of which answered to the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China.

The three institutions interacted with the AMCs as follows:
•
•
•

The Ministry of Finance (MoF) controlled the chairmanship for each of the AMCs’
boards of directors.
The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) issued licenses defining the AMCs’ business scope
and supervised the corresponding state-owned commercial banks.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) supplied securities-related
business permits and regulated the AMCs’ business operations (Fung and Ma 2002).

In order to carry out its debt-for-equity swap operations and resolve legal or logistical
disputes, the AMCs would occasionally have to interface with other public institutions, such
as the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation, and state and local governments (Fung and Ma 2002).
While the four largest state-owned commercial banks had no “formal” or “direct” equity
stake in their partner AMCs, the informal relationship was not clear-cut (Fung and Ma 2002).
The AMCs were staffed by former bank employees, while the president of each bank also
served as the designated party chief of the corresponding AMC (Fung and Ma 2002).
Beginning in April 2003, the newly established China Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
became the main supervisory and regulatory authority responsible for overseeing the four
AMCs. However, the AMCs were still required to report on a monthly basis to the MoF and
PBoC and undergo onsite inspections by central bank officials (Fung et al. 2011).
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Size: The government intended to equip the AMCs to deal with approximately
RMB 1 trillion in NPLs, which amounted to slightly less than half of the estimated
NPLs held by all Chinese banks.

Ultimately, NPL transfers to the AMCs totaled approximately 13.5% of GDP by March 2005
(García-Herrero 2006).
8.

Funding Source: It seems that the purchases of non-performing loans from stateowned commercial banks were funded exclusively by the Chinese government.

The State Council allowed the AMCs to be financed by four sources: MoF equity, borrowed
funds from the PBoC, AMC-specific bonds, and commercial borrowing from other financial
institutions (Fung and Ma 2002).5 There are no official documents describing the sources in
detail. Fung and Ma (2002) provide estimates based on limited public information.
The MoF initially provided an equity capital injection of RMB 10 billion to each AMC; because
the transactions do not appear in state budget documents, it remains unclear how this
funding was raised. While some portion of the investment probably comprised in-kind
contributions (such as operational equipment), Fung and Ma (2002) treat the equity as cash
in their analysis. The authors estimate that the RMB 40 billion accounts for about 3% of total
funding to the AMCs.
It is likely that a substantial amount of funding for the AMCs (about 14%, or RMB 192 billion)
was provided by the PBoC in the form of cash lending; however, only one AMC, Huarong
Asset Management Company, disclosed funding from the PBoC on its balance sheet.
According to Fung and Ma (2002), the PBoC funding did not “seem to have the expected
monetary consequences,” in that China’s overall reserves remained stable and average
growth only amounted to 8% per annum at the time.6 The authors (2002) speculate that
some “offsetting movements,” namely the 65% decline (RMB 340 billion) in PBoC claims on
the four SOCBs in 2000, contributed to the decrease in the banks’ liabilities. The SOCBs may
have used their free reserves resulting from the NPL transfers to pay off their PBoC liabilities,
or the central bank itself could have sterilized its lending to the AMCs by recalling its
previous loans to the SOCBs. It is also possible that the PBoC financing might have been
presented in the form of “liability transfers,” which would have involved the AMCs paying
for their NPL purchases by assuming the SOCBs’ liabilities to the PBoC (Fung and Ma 2002).
Most of the funding—83% of policy transfers, or RMB 1.168 trillion—was financed by the
issuance of non-tradable AMC bonds to the big four state-owned commercial banks. The
“general belief” in Chinese financial markets was that the government would not let the

There was no evidence that the AMCs borrowed from private-sector sources as of 2001. Assuming there was
no outside funding, Fung and Ma estimate that the partner banks swapped RMB 1.4 trillion in NPLs for a total
of RMB 1.168 trillion in new AMC bonds and RMB 232 billion in cash (from the MoF and PBoC) (2002, 4). For a
more detailed (but still speculative) breakdown of funding sources, please refer to Fung and Ma 2002.
6 For a more detailed explanation of the monetary implications of PBoC financing, please refer to Fung and
Ma, 2002.
5
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AMCs default on their bonds; “the Chinese AMCs [were thus] viewed as governmentsponsored agencies” (Fung and Ma 2002). However, the government asserted a policy of
“constructive ambiguity,” encouraging speculation about which institution (e.g., the MoF, the
PBoC, or state-owned commercial banks) would bear the risk of default (Fung and Ma 2002).
Without an implicit state guarantee, the AMC bonds would probably not have achieved a
better risk rating than their underlying NPLs (Fung and Ma 2002).
The Chinese government set an interest rate of 2.25% on both AMC bonds and PBoC credit
to the AMCs. This rate was based on the official one-year bank deposit rate in 2001. Using
Fung and Ma’s (2002) estimates (MoF equity amounting to RMB 40 billion combined with
the PBoC policy purchase of RMB 1.4 trillion), the four AMCs collectively borrowed RMB 1.36
trillion and thus owed over RMB 30 billion in annual interest.
9.

Eligible Institutions: Initially, four public AMCs were matched with the four
largest state-owned commercial banks.

The partner AMC-bank pairings were designated as follows:
•
•
•
•

Orient Asset Management – Bank of China
Great Wall Asset Management – Agricultural Bank of China
Cinda Asset Management – China Construction Bank7
Huarong Asset Management – Industrial and Construction Bank of China (Fung and
Ma 2002)

According to García-Herrero et al. (2006), separation of NPL recovery operations between
the four banks was seen to have had two advantages. First, it would be easier to divide and
conquer the overwhelmingly diffuse client base and small loan amounts. Second, it seemed
advantageous to assign specific AMCs their partner banks based on specialization (e.g., Great
Wall would deal with NPLs from the agriculture sector).
At some unspecified point between the first and second NPL transfer, the AMC/partner-bank
model evolved into a more traditional auction model. This allowed AMCs to place bids for
the remaining assets (García-Herrero et al. 2006). Cinda Asset Management, which had far
outperformed its counterparts in terms of maximizing asset recovery, won the bid from the
four SOCBs by promising 30% asset recovery (Fung and Ma 2002; García-Herrero et al.
2006).
10. Eligible Assets: Eligible assets were restricted to NPLs generated by policy
lending prior to 1996.
Chinese authorities faced a “daunting” NPL problem in the 1990s, mostly due to the
significant amounts of policy loans left over from the centrally planned economy (Fung and

Cinda also differed slightly in that it ultimately acquired NPLs from the China Development Bank, one of
China’s three policy banks (Fung and Ma 2002, 1).
7
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Ma 2002). In addition, weak SOE performance and unregulated credit-risk controls on stateowned commercial banks contributed to the proliferation of bad loans (Fung and Ma 2002).
These “policy-based” transfers were also explicitly authorized and financed by the
government (Fung and Ma 2002). In order to avoid issues of moral hazard, the government
took responsibility for bank losses resulting from policy lending that occurred only before
1996. Officials declared an end to policy-driven NPL transfers in 2001 (Fung and Ma 2002).
11. Acquisition (Mechanics): The AMCs would remove NPLs from the state-owned
commercial banks in exchange for government cash, credit, and AMC bonds.
Between 1999 and 2000, RMB 1.4 trillion in NPLs were transferred at face value from the
state-owned commercial banks to four partner AMCs in exchange for government cash,
credit, and AMC bonds. These transfers accounted for over 20% of the big four banks’
combined loan portfolios and amounted to about 18% of the country’s GDP in 1998.
However, the scope of the NPL transfers may have been much greater than what was
revealed at the time (Fung and Ma 2002).8
12. Acquisition (Pricing): The first wave of transfers of NPLs from state-owned
commercial banks to the AMCs were conducted uniformly at book value;
subsequent purchases used an auction-based model.
The second wave of transfers employed an auction-based model to award NPLs to the
highest-bidding AMC. Cinda Asset Management, which promised 30% recovery and had
previously outperformed the other AMCs, won the auction (García-Herrero et al. 2006, 315;
Fung and Ma 2002, 12).
13. Disposal/Recovery: The AMCs were expected to collect what they could on the
sale of assets by repackaging the loans and selling them at a discount on the
secondary markets.
The AMCs claimed an average NPL resolution rate of 49.4% by March 2005 (García-Herrero
2006).
If the AMCs were unable to dispose of all transferred NPLs by the specified end date of 2006,
the MoF would either take over the nominal equity or directly write off the remaining bad
debt (Bonin and Huang 2000). As of March 2005, the AMCs had collectively recovered RMB
136.3 billion (USD 16.9 billion) in cash by the disposal of assets (García-Herrero et al. 2006).

For further analysis and commentary regarding the scope of uncertainties surrounding the NPL problem,
please refer to Fung and Ma 2002.
8

494

China: 1999 Asset Management Corporations

Engbith

14. Timeframe: Although each AMC was set up to operate for a period of ten years,
the government later set the end of 2006 as the deadline for the resolution of
NPLs .
Chinese officials announced upon establishment that the AMCs would operate for ten years;
however, this provision was never explicitly stated in the State Council executive order
(Fung et al. 2011). This timeframe was decided upon such that sunset provisions could be
included from the outset (Bonin and Huang 2000).
Later, the government set the end of 2006 as the deadline for the resolution of all NPLs held
by the four AMCs (García-Herrero et al. 2006).
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